Missing the Joke: Reduced Rereading of Garden-Path Jokes During Mind-Wandering

Han Zhang1, 2, Chuyan Qu1, Kevin F. Miller2, and Kai S. Cortina2, 3
1 Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University
2 Combined Program in Education and Psychology, University of Michigan
3 Department of Neurology, University of Michigan

Mind-wandering (i.e., thoughts irrelevant to the current task) occurs frequently during reading. The current study examined whether mind-wandering was associated with reduced rereading when the reader read the so-called garden-path jokes. In a garden-path joke, the reader’s initial interpretation is violated by the final punchline, and the violation creates a semantic incongruity that needs to be resolved (e.g., “My girlfriend has read so many negative things about smoking. Therefore, she decided to quit reading.”). Rereading text prior to the punchline can help resolve the incongruity. In a main study and a preregistered replication, participants read jokes and nonfunny controls embedded in filler texts and responded to thought probes that assessed intentional and unintentional mind-wandering. Results were consistent across the two studies: When the reader was not mind-wandering, jokes elicited more rereading (from the punchline) than the nonfunny controls did, and had a recall advantage over the nonfunny controls. During mind-wandering, however, the additional eye movement processing and the recall advantage of jokes were generally reduced. These results show that mind-wandering is associated with reduced rereading, which is important for resolving higher level comprehension difficulties.

Keywords: mind-wandering, eye movements, humor, reading

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000745.supp

Reading comprehension is susceptible to mind-wandering, a mental state in which attention shifts from the external task to self-generated, task-irrelevant thoughts (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). How does mind-wandering change the way people read? Can these changes reveal impairments of the cognitive processes underlying reading? During the past few years, an increasing number of studies have used eye-tracking to study these questions (Faber et al., 2018; Foulsham et al., 2013; Reichle et al., 2010; Schad et al., 2012; Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011). One benefit of using eye-tracking is its direct examination of the “eye-mind” link—the extent to which cognition actively controls what people are looking at. But, due to reduced top–down control of comprehension, this link may break down during mind-wandering.

The normal reading process can be generally described as going through a hierarchy of stages, from extracting lexical meanings from printed words (Pollatsek et al., 2006), to integrating words into propositions (Frazier, 1998), and finally to establishing a coherent understanding of the entire passage (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). A number of eye-tracking studies have shown that during mind-wandering, the normal association between fixation duration and lexical properties of the word (e.g., longer looking times for low-frequency words) was reduced (Foulsham et al., 2013; Reichle et al., 2010; Schad et al., 2012), suggesting deficits during lexical processing.

Smallwood (2011) reasoned that impairments in early stages of reading can have implications for later processes, so mind-wandering should have profound impacts on higher level processes. Extant studies examining higher level processes have typically used self-paced reading (for an exception, see Schad et al., 2012). One study asked participants to read “gibberish” texts that changed the order of nouns or pronouns (as described in Smallwood, 2011). Not being able to detect gibberish texts quickly, according to the authors, would indicate impairment in the creation of propositions. Results showed that when readers were mind-
wandering, they were likely to keep reading without noticing that the text had become gibberish. Another study (Smallwood et al., 2008) asked participants to read a Sherlock Holmes story word-by-word and found that, if participants were mind-wandering when critical clues about the villain were offered, they were less likely to correctly infer the identity of the villain. The authors argued that mind-wandering at critical points interfered with the integration of important events necessary to identify the villain.

In the self-paced reading paradigm, participants can see only one word at a time and are not permitted to look back at previous portions of the text. However, during free reading, about 10% to 15% of saccades move backward to previous text (Rayner, 1998). One important reason for making such regressions is to resolve difficulties during higher level stages of comprehension (for a review, see Bicknell & Levy, 2011). Therefore, studying how rereading behavior is affected during mind-wandering can advance our understanding of the mental state’s effect on reading. Interestingly, previous studies did not find consistent evidence that rereading was affected during mind-wandering (for a review, see Steindorf & Rummel, 2019), possibly because participants were not processing texts in which rereading is critical for comprehension.

In what situation do people tend to reread? One example is when they read the so-called garden-path jokes (Dynel, 2009). Garden-path jokes elicit humor by violating the reader’s original interpretation of the text at the final punchline. To “get” the joke, the reader must resolve the semantic incongruity, or in other words, find a new interpretation of the text (Suls, 1972, 1983), for example, “For more than 40 years, I have only loved one woman. I hope my wife will never know” (Mayerhofer & Schacht, 2015, p. 4).

In a garden-path joke, the set-up is designed to be compatible with at least two interpretations. However, to the reader one interpretation is highly salient, as determined by the reader’s general world knowledge. Thus, the reader is “tricked” to adopt the salient interpretation before encountering the punchline. In the previous example, readers may wrongly assume that the set-up describes a loyal husband. However, this interpretation is violated at the punchline, causing a semantic incongruity. Thus, the reader must backtrack the set-up to search for the covert interpretation to resolve the difficulty. For example, the reader may adopt a new interpretation that the husband has been cheating on his wife for 40 years. The successful resolution of semantic incongruity allows for a sense of amusement (Dynel, 2009). Note that a nonfunny but coherent version of the joke can be constructed by simply replacing “know” to “forget.” Doing so will reduce the text’s semantic incongruity and humor potential.

The incongruity-resolution process of garden-path jokes can be indexed by behavioral and physiological measures. In a self-paced reading task, joke endings received longer reading time than the ending of nonfunny control sentences did (Mayerhofer & Schacht, 2015, Experiment 1). Electrocorticography data showed that joke endings elicited a larger N400 component compared to coherent endings, indicating semantic integration difficulties (Mayerhofer & Schacht, 2015, Experiment 2 and 3). Importantly, Coulson et al. (2006) used a free reading paradigm and showed that garden-path jokes, compared to nonfunny controls, produced more rereading eye movements from the ending. This finding, according to the authors, shows a processing cost due to the construction of an alternative cognitive model of the text (Coulson et al., 2006).

Some important features distinguish garden-path jokes from traditional garden-path sentences (e.g., “The horse raced past the barn fell”; Frazier & Rayner, 1982, p. 179) and gibberish texts. The incongruity and its resolution of garden-path jokes are localized at the semantic level rather than the syntactic level. In other words, the reader is prompted to discover an alternative meaning rather than an alternative parsing. Other researchers have described this process as a frame-shifting (Coulson & Kutas, 1998), a forced reinterpretation (Ritchie, 2004), or a belief revision (Mayerhofer & Schacht, 2015), all of which point to a reanalysis at the semantic level. During this process, the reader must consult their general world knowledge or previous experience to reinterpret the linguistic input. Thus, the resolution of comprehension difficulties occurs at an advanced level of understanding and requires a close coupling between attention and the linguistic input. This may make its processing highly susceptible to mind-wandering (Schad et al., 2012). Moreover, compared to gibberish texts, garden-path jokes are intelligible, which might render them more ecologically valid. In sum, we believe that garden-path jokes provide a promising opportunity to study how mind-wandering affects higher level processes of reading.

The Current Study

The current study sought to investigate whether mind-wandering affected the resolution of semantic incongruity, a higher level cognitive process required for understanding garden-path jokes. Previous research has suggested that a critical index of this process is rereading from the punchline. Therefore, we recorded participants’ eye movements while they read garden-path jokes and nonfunny controls embedded in filler texts. Participants responded to thought probes after each joke and control text to report mind-wandering. Our hypothesis was straightforward: The incongruity-resolution process was present when attention was on the task but was impaired during mind-wandering.

Mind-wandering encompasses a wide range of mental experiences that vary in numerous dimensions (Seli et al., 2018). Recent evidence suggests that mind-wandering can emerge with or without intention (Seli et al., 2016). Unintentional mind-wandering reflects a spontaneous shift from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts, despite the individual’s willingness to stay on task. However, it is estimated that more than one third of mind-wandering thoughts emerge with intention, a controlled and deliberate disengagement (Seli et al., 2015, 2016). Previous research has shown that intentional and unintentional mind-wandering are sometimes dissociable. For example, increasing task difficulty reduces the rate of intentional mind-wandering but increases the rate of unintentional mind-wandering (Seli et al., 2016); task motivation correlates more strongly with intentional mind-wandering than with unintentional mind-wandering (Seli et al., 2015). That said, both types of mind-wandering were found to impair task performance in a sustained-attention task (Seli et al., 2015) and a video lecture task (Seli et al., 2016). Their similar effects are not surprising, because both types of mind-wandering involve a decoupling of attention from the task at hand. In sum, it
is important to treat mind-wandering not as a unitary concept, even if we predict that intentional and unintentional mind-wandering have similar effects on the incongruity-resolution process.

**Experiment 1**

**Method**

**Participants**

Forty-seven undergraduate students from the University of Michigan (\(M_{\text{age}} = 18.96, SD = .95, 25\) female) participated in the study for course credit. All participants were native English speakers with normal eyesight. Due to technical failures, three participants completed only half of the experiment. However, their data were included in data analyses.

**Apparatus and Stimuli**

We obtained 46 garden-path jokes and their corresponding nonfunny control texts. Each joke-control pair shared the same texts up until the ending. The jokes’ endings were designed to elicit humor by violating the previous set-up. The nonfunny controls’ endings were designed to be coherent and neutral. Thirty-nine joke-control pairs differed only in the final word, and the other seven pairs differed in the last two words. In addition, 480 neutral fillers were constructed to mimic the linguistic style (e.g., length, topic, difficulty, etc.) of the target sentences. Some examples are shown below. See the online supplemental materials for full stimuli.

1. **Joke:** For more than 40 years, I have only loved one woman. I hope my wife will never know.

2. **Control:** For more than 40 years, I have only loved one woman. I hope my wife will never forget.

3. **Filler:** I walked into the grocery store. I was going there to buy my favorite energy drink.

As a manipulation check, we recruited 60 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to rate the jokes and the nonfunny controls on three scales: comprehensibility, funniness, and predictability of the ending. Each scale included three items. All items used a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). These rating scales were developed by Mayerhofer and Schacht (2015) and were used to evaluate the garden-path jokes used in their study. Every worker rated 23 jokes and 23 controls. One joke-control pair had very low comprehensibility (2.58, the rest: \(M = 3.96, SD = 1.03\)). We included this pair in the experiment for the convenience of constructing stimuli presentation orders (as described later in this section), but data from this pair was discarded from all subsequent data analyses.

We used linear mixed models (lme4, Bates et al., 2015) to examine differences between the jokes and the nonfunny controls with maximum random effects. We used the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017) to obtain approximation of \(p\) values. Results show that, compared to controls, jokes were rated as funnier (\(b = 1.05, SE = 0.12, t = 9.10, p < .001\)) and had less predictable endings (\(b = -0.76, SE = 0.10, t = -7.80, p < .001\)). However, jokes were not significantly less comprehensible than controls (\(b = 0.12, SE = 0.07, t = 1.71, p = .09\)). Figure 1 shows the mean ratings of jokes and controls on the three scales. In sum, the Mechanical Turkers’ ratings confirmed the validity of our stimuli.

Based on the 46 joke-control pairs, we constructed 16 pseudo-random stimuli presentation orders. In every order, (a) 23 of the texts appeared as jokes and the other 23 appeared as nonfunny controls, and (b) each joke and nonfunny control was preceded by five to 15 fillers. We spaced out target texts with fillers to increase the distance between probes (the thought probe occurred after every joke and control), as frequently probing the participant can reduce mind-wandering reports; Seli et al., 2013). The average distance between two targets was 10 fillers. This resulted in each participant reading 526 texts throughout the experiment: 46 target texts (23 jokes and 23 controls) embedded in 480 filler trials. We

**Figure 1**

*Mean Ratings of Jokes and Nonfunny Control Sentences by Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers*

![Graph showing mean ratings of jokes and nonfunny controls](image)

**Note.** Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
divided the whole experiment into two blocks of the same size: Both blocks have 23 target trials (11 jokes and 12 controls, or vice versa) embedded in 240 filler trials. Further, we ensured that, across all the 16 orders, each text appeared (a) equally often as joke and control and (b) equally often in the first and the second block.

Stimuli were presented on a 20.1-in. computer screen at approximately 70 cm to the participant. The text was 37.5-point Times New Roman font. Each letter subtended horizontally about 0.65° of visual angle. Monocular eye movements were recorded by the EyeLink 1000 System (SR Research Ltd., Canada) at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. To ensure comfort, no chin rest was used and head movement was adjusted by tracking a sticker on participants’ forehead. The experiment was implemented using the OpenSesame software (Mathôt et al., 2012) with functions from the PyGaze package (Dalmajer et al., 2014).

Procedure

The experiment began with a survey asking all participants to make a to-do list for the next 5 days, as future-planning has been shown to increase mind-wandering rate during a subsequent task (Kopp et al., 2015). Then, we introduced the reading task to the participants. Participants were asked to read sentences for comprehension. Participants at this point did not know the existence of jokes or the nature of the test afterward. This was done to ensure that rereading did not result from participants’ purposefully memorizing the jokes.

Next, participants were told that, during reading, a thought probe would occur occasionally, which required them to report whether they were on-task or off-task during the previous text. The experimenter introduced the definitions of on-task and off-task:

Being on-task means that, just before the screen appeared, you were focused on completing the task and were not thinking about anything unrelated to the task. Off-task means that just before the screen appeared, you were thinking about something completely unrelated to the task. (Seli et al., 2016, p. 1)

Because the framing of thought probe can affect reported mind-wandering rate (Weinstein, 2018), we used a neutral question (“Just now where was your attention?”). Participants were asked to answer “on-task” or “off-task” by pressing the corresponding key. We also randomly switched the order of on-task and off-task options across participants to reduce any confounds due to ordering. If “off-task” was chosen, participants were asked to indicate whether mind-wandering was intentional of unintentional. Intentional mind-wandering was defined as “you intentionally decided to think about things that are unrelated to the task,” and unintentional mind-wandering was defined as “your thoughts drifted away despite your best intentions to focus on the task” (Seli et al., 2015). The order of this question’s options was also randomized across participants.

We assigned participants to one of the 16 stimuli orders based on their participant numbers. After calibrating the eye tracker, participants completed five practice trials. Each trial started with a fixation dot located at the position of the first letter of the upcoming text. The text appeared once a stable gaze signal at the dot was detected. Together with the text, there was a small fixation dot at the bottom-right corner of the screen. Participants were asked to move their focus to this dot once they have finished this trial. The trial ended once a stable gaze signal was detected at this dot. After recalibrating the eye tracker, the experimental trials started. The task proceeded in an automated fashion. The thought probe occurred after every target sentence (i.e., jokes/nonfunny controls). A research assistant quietly sat outside the participant’s field of vision and monitored the gaze-overlaid stimuli on a second monitor. Recalibration was conducted if tracking quality deteriorated.

After reading, participants were asked to complete a recall test to fill out the ending of each target trial (i.e., the part that was different between jokes and controls) with the previous text given. There was no time limit for this test. The entire experiment took about 120 min.

Data Analysis

Fixations greater than 1,500 ms or shorter than 80 ms were discarded (3.92% of data). We chose a relatively high upper bound because mind-wandering was known to produce longer fixation duration compared to normal reading (Faber et al., 2018; Reichle et al., 2010). Because the incongruity-resolution process strictly speaks to what happens after the reader encounters the punchline, the analysis region was set to where the jokes and controls differ. In the previous example, the analysis region would be the word “know” for jokes and “forget” for controls. For the seven joke-control pairs that differed in the last two words, the analysis region included both words. We examined the following measures: (a) recall (a binary variable indicating whether the answer matches the original text), (b) regressions–out (a count variable indicating the number of regressions from the analysis region to previous words), (c) regression–path duration (the sum of all fixations from entering the analysis region to the last fixation on the entire text), (d) gaze duration (the sum of all fixations from entering the analysis region for the first time until leaving the region), (e) total looking time (the sum of all fixations on the analysis region), and (f) skipping (a binary variable indicating whether the analysis region was not fixated on throughout the trial). We used recall performance as an offline measure of the incongruity-resolution process. If jokes received additional visual processing (compared to controls), we expected that this should translate to better memory of the endings (Strick et al., 2009). Thus, we expected a significant recall advantage for jokes (compared to controls) only when participants indicated on-task. Regressions–out and regression–path duration are critical measures for this study, because they can indicate the degree to which participants reanalyzed the text from the ending. We expected more such rereading for jokes than for controls, but only when the reader was on-task. We used gaze duration, total looking time, and skipping as supplemental measures. They do not directly speak to the rereading process but nevertheless offer important details of how the ending was processed. Gaze duration, in relation to total looking time, measures early stages of language processing because it only includes first-pass reading. Coulson et al. (2006) found that gaze duration was not statistically different between jokes and controls, but they found a trend for longer total looking time for joke endings. We included these two measures to compare

1 Off-task was used as a synonym for mind-wandering in the experiment.
our results to previous research. Finally, not skipping the ending is likely a prerequisite for the incongruity-resolution process. A joke’s ending might be less likely to be skipped than a nonfunny control’s ending, but this effect, if true, should only occur when the participant was on-task.

We conducted a set of a priori contrasts to analyze the measures (Ruxton & Beauchamp, 2008; Schad et al., 2018). We created four orthogonal contrasts: one contrast for the effect of text type (joke/control) for each type of attention (on-task/intentional mind-wandering/unintentional mind-wandering), and an additional contrast for the difference between mind-wandering and non-mind-wandering conditions. The fourth contrast was exploratory and tested how sentence endings, aggregating over jokes and controls, were processed during mind-wandering and non-mind-wandering. A weight matrix of the contrasts can be found in the online supplemental material. A regression model was built for each of the six dependent measures. Duration measures were log-transformed to fit to linear mixed models. Binary and count measures were modeled by generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs). Specifically, recall and skipping were modeled by binomial GLMMs with a logit link. Regressions—out were modeled by a Poisson GLMM with a log link (the default option). For convenience and clarity, in all models, we collapsed text type and attention into a single variable of six groups called condition. We applied our custom contrasts to condition. Because word length and word frequency were known to influence eye movements (Kliegl et al., 2004; Rayner, 1998), and because the jokes and controls were not equated on these measures, we included word length and the logarithm of word frequency as covariates in all models of eye movement measures. Random effects included (a) variations across participants, (b) variations across text frames, (c) variations for each (observed) combination of participant and condition, and (d) variations for each (observed) combination of text frames and condition. The R package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) was used for all model-fitting. Approximations of $p$ values came from the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017).

### Homographs

Figure 1 (upper-middle panels) provides an illustration of the subject-aggregate data for the experimental effects of interest for the homograph stimuli (eye-tracking measures, switching, and word type) at the downstream target region. 

### Core Models

In core gaze duration models for homographs, there were no significant effects (all $t < 1.96$, $p > 0.05$). In core total reading time models for homographs, there were no significant effects (all $t < 1.96$, $p > 0.05$). Of note, the effect of word type approached significance ($\beta = -0.09, SE = 0.05, t = -1.72, p = 0.0896$).

### Results

Overall, we obtained 1,195 on-task trials (58.35%), 546 unintentional mind-wandering trials (26.66%), and 307 intentional mind-wandering trials (14.99%). Additional details about the number of trials in each condition for each measure can be found in the online supplemental materials.

### Recall Performance

The probability of correct answers in each condition was shown in Figure 2a. When participants indicated they were on-task, joke endings were more likely correctly recalled than neutral endings were, $b = 0.59, SE = 0.22, z = 2.74, p = .01$. However, this recall advantage was reduced during unintentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.55, SE = 0.29, z = 1.91, p = .06$, and was eliminated during intentional mind-wandering, $b = -0.04, SE = 0.39, z = -0.11, p = .91$. For the fourth contrast, recall was better when participants were on-task compared to when they were mind-wandering, $b = 1.16, SE = 0.17, z = 7.00, p < .001$.

### Eye Movement Measures

Two critical indices of incongruity resolution were regressions–out and regression–path duration. Their marginal means were shown in Figures 2b and 2c, respectively. When participants were on-task, jokes, compared to nonfunny controls, elicited more regressions–out, $b = 0.28, SE = 0.11, z = 2.56, p = .01$. However, this difference was not significant during either unintentional mind-wandering, $b = -0.15, SE = 0.19, z = -0.80, p = .42$, or intentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.11, SE = 0.26, z = 0.43, p = .67$. For the last contrast, participants produced more regressions–out in general when they were on-task than when they were mind-wandering, $b = 0.38, SE = 0.10, z = 3.77, p < .001$.

Similarly, regression–path duration was longer for jokes than for controls when participants were on-task, $b = 0.09, SE = 0.03, t = 2.74, p = .01$. But this difference was not significant during either unintentional mind-wandering, $b = -0.02, SE = 0.05, t = -0.36, p = .72$, or intentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.08, SE = 0.07, t = 1.18, p = .24$. Finally, an overall difference was observed between on-task and mind-wandering, $b = 0.08, SE = 0.03, t = 2.84, p = .005$.

We then looked at gaze duration (Figure 2d) and total looking time (Figure 2e) on the analysis region. For gaze duration, we did not find a significant difference between jokes and controls even when participants indicated being on-task, $b = 0.02, SE = 0.02, t = 1.26, p = .21$. The difference was also not significant during unintentional mind-wandering, $b = .002, SE = 0.02, t = 0.36, p = .72$, or intentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.04, SE = 0.03, t = 1.26, p = .21$. There was also no significant difference in gaze duration between on-task and mind-wandering in general, $b = -0.002, SE = 0.01, t = 0.01, p = .99$.

On the other hand, jokes produced significantly longer total looking time than controls did, when participants were on-task, $b = 0.04, SE = 0.02, t = 2.25, p = .02$. However, there was no significant difference during unintentional mind-wandering, $b = -0.003, SE = 0.03, t = -0.13, p = .90$, or intentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.07, SE = 0.04, t = 1.79, p = .07$. Total looking time did not significantly differ between on-task and mind-wandering in general, $b = 0.01, SE = 0.01, t = 0.98, p = .33$.

---

2 For the seven pairs that differed in the last two words, we used their total length and frequency of the phrase (from the Corpus of Contemporary American English, Davies, 2008). Results were similar without these covariates.

3 Versions of R packages: R (Version 3.5.1; R Core Team, 2018) and the R packages dplyr (Version 0.7.8; Wickham et al., 2018), emmeans (Version 1.1.3; Lenth, 2018), ggplot2 (Version 3.0.0; Wickham, 2016), gridExtra (Version 2.3; Auguie, 2017), tableExtra (Version 0.9.0; Zhu, 2018), lmerTest (Version 3.0.1; Kuznetsova et al., 2017), MASS (Version 7.3.49; Venables & Ripley, 2002), papaja (Version 0.1.9842; Aust & Barth, 2018), sjPlot (Version 2.5.0; Lüdecke, 2018), and tidyr (Version 0.8.1; Wickham & Henry, 2018).
Finally, we looked at the probability of skipping the analysis region (Figure 2e). When participants were on-task, joke endings were no less likely to be skipped than control endings were, $b = -0.19$, $SE = 0.15$, $z = -1.24$, $p = .21$. Moreover, the difference between jokes and controls was not significant during unintentional mind-wandering, $b = -0.08$, $SE = 0.21$, $z = -0.36$, $p = .72$, or intentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.37$, $SE = 0.28$, $z = 1.32$, $p = .19$. However, there was less skipping overall when participants were on-task than when they were mind-wandering, $b = -0.33$, $SE = 0.12$, $z = -2.67$, $p = .008$.

**Discussion**

We examined how mind-wandering affected the semantic incongruity-resolution process of garden-path jokes. We hypothesized that the incongruity-resolution process would be impaired during both intentional and unintentional mind-wandering, but not when participants were on-task. The most important measures of this process were regressions–out and regression–path duration from the punchline. Our results show that, when participants were on-task, joke endings elicited more regressions–out and longer regression–path duration than nonfunny controls did. These results provide a benchmark for how jokes (compared to controls) were processed without mind-wandering, which replicated Coulson et al. (2006)’s findings. However, the additional rereading of jokes was reduced during both intentional and unintentional mind-wandering, indicating impairments in the incongruity-resolution process.

We also examined several supplemental measures, including gaze duration, total looking time, and skipping. Similar to results in Coulson et al. (2006), only total looking time had a significant difference between jokes and controls when participants were on-task. Therefore, in addition of rereading previous texts, participants examined the punchline more than once, suggesting efforts of integrating the punchline and the set-up. This difference in total looking time was not observed during unintentional mind-wandering. Interestingly, for both gaze duration and total looking time, the intentional mind-wandering condition seemed to have a larger effect than the on-task condition did (although the differences were not significant in both cases). Perhaps during intentional mind-wandering, participants could sometimes notice the
incongruity, leading to longer looking time at the ending. However, they did not put enough effort in rereading, presumably because of a lack of motivation.

For skipping, we did not find a significant difference in either the on-task, the intentional mind-wandering, or the unintentional mind-wandering condition. This finding is similar to that for gaze duration, as both speak to relatively early stages of reading. These findings suggest that the resolution of incongruity occurred at a relatively late stage, and it might not have been salient enough to affect early measures. Moreover, sentence endings naturally define processing units, and they might be important to look at for the control sentences as well.

Finally, we used recall performance as an offline measure of the incongruity-resolution process. If joke endings attracted additional attention, this would be reflected by how well participants remembered the endings (Strick et al., 2009). Our results show that the recall advantage observed when participants were on-task was reduced during mind-wandering, which was consistent with the eye-tracking results. Importantly, this measure does not directly speak to whether participants really “got” the joke, a point we shall return to in the General Discussion.

Overall, our results show a clear pattern of how mind-wandering affected rereading and recall of garden-path jokes, signaling impairments in the incongruity-resolution process. Following Experiment 1, we conducted a preregistered replication, to see if our major findings can be replicated.

Experiment 2

We made some minor changes in the stimuli and procedure of Experiment 1, as specified in the sections below. All changes were preregistered. The preregistration protocol is available at https://osf.io/jg27v/.

Method

Unless stated otherwise, the methodology remained the same as that in Experiment 1.

Participants

We recruited 46 undergraduate students from the University of Michigan to participate in the study for course credit. According to the preregistered data exclusion criteria, we discarded data from three participants for technical failures, and three participants for not completing the entire experiment. The final sample size was 40 ($M_{age} = 18.85$, $SD = .89$, 23 female), which was specified in the preregistration. All participants were native English speakers with normal eyesight.

Stimuli

In Experiment 1, one joke-control pair was rated to have low comprehensibility and seven joke-control pairs differed in the last two words. In the replication, we replaced them with eight new joke-control pairs that differed in only the last word. We recruited another 120 online workers to rate the new texts on the same scales used in Experiment 1. Together with the items that remained the same, jokes did not statistically differ from the controls in comprehensibility ($b = 0.14$, $SE = 0.07$, $t = 1.85$, $p = .07$), but jokes were still rated as funnier ($b = 1.07$, $SE = 0.09$, $t = 11.46$, $p < .001$), and had less predictable endings ($b = −0.66$, $SE = 0.08$, $t = −7.83$, $p < .001$) than the controls did. These changes to the material were preregistered.

Procedure

Due to constraints in time and personnel, we reduced the number of filler trials from 480 to 336 (randomly dropped). As a result, two consecutive target trials were separated by five to nine fillers, with an average distance of seven (previously 10). All other aspects of the procedure remained the same as in Experiment 1. The entire experiment now took about 90 min. These changes to the procedure were also preregistered.

Data Analysis

Unless otherwise stated, there was no deviation from what was specified in the preregistration or from what was used in Experiment 1.

Results

We obtained 1,103 on-task trials (59.95%), 468 unintentional mind-wandering trials (25.43%), and 269 intentional mind-wandering trials (14.62%). Mind-wandering frequency was comparable to that in Experiment 1.

Recall Performance

Similar to Experiment 1, when on-task, participants significantly more likely recalled a joke’s ending than a nonfunny control’s ending, $b = 0.71$, $SE = 0.19$, $z = 3.71$, $p < .001$. This recall advantage was again reduced during unintentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.47$, $SE = 0.26$, $z = 1.79$, $p = .07$, and intentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.28$, $SE = 0.33$, $z = 0.86$, $p = .39$. For the fourth contrast, the overall difference between on-task and mind-wandering was significant, $b = 1.14$, $SE = 0.15$, $z = 7.53$, $p < .001$ (refer to the online supplemental materials for the marginal means).

Eye Movement Measures

Participants had more regressions–out from punchlines than from the controls’ endings when they were on-task, $b = 0.36$, $SE = 0.11$, $z = 3.28$, $p = .001$. This difference was reduced during both unintentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.32$, $SE = 0.16$, $z = 1.98$, $p = .05$, and intentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.15$, $SE = 0.22$, $z = 0.69$, $p = .49$. Different from Experiment 1, the overall difference between on-task and mind-wandering was not significant, $b = 0.09$, $SE = 0.09$, $z = 0.99$, $p = .32$.

Participants made longer regression–path duration from punchlines than from neutral endings when they were on-task, $b = 0.13$, $SE = 0.04$, $t = 3.06$, $p = .003$. This difference was reduced during unintentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.11$, $SE = 0.06$, $t = 2.00$, $p = .05$. Interestingly, we found a somewhat larger estimate of the difference during intentional mind-wandering, $b = 0.16$, $SE = 0.08$, although it was only marginally significant, $t = 2.00$, $p = .05$. Finally, no significant difference was found between on-task and mind-wandering, $b < .001$, $SE = 0.03$, $t = 0.02$, $p = .99$, different from Experiment 1.

Similar to Experiment 1, we did not find any significant difference in gaze duration, $ps > .10$. Different from Experiment 1, however, the difference in total looking time between jokes and
nonfunny controls in the on-task condition was not significant, $b = 0.02$, $SE = 0.02$, $t = 0.81$, $p = .42$. The difference was also not significant during either unintentional mind-wandering or intentional mind-wandering, $p > .05$.

Finally, we did not find any significant difference in skipping, $ps > .10$. In particular, the overall difference between on-task and mind-wandering was not significant, $b = -0.09$, $SE = 0.13$, $z = -0.70$, $p = .48$.

**Discussion**

Despite some changes in stimuli and procedure, we observed significantly more rereading and better recall for joke endings compared to neutral endings when participants were on-task. These differences were generally reduced during both unintentional and intentional mind-wandering. Quite interestingly, there seemed to be a larger effect in regression–path duration between jokes and controls during intentional mind-wandering, compared to that when participants were on-task. Unlike regressions–out, duration measures treated skipping as a missing value instead of a zero. Thus, this difference only referred to cases in which the last word was fixated on. Nevertheless, these results raised the possibility that, during intentional mind-wandering, the incongruity-resolution process was not always affected.

Different from Experiment 1, we did not observe a significant difference in total looking time when participants were on-task. In self-paced reading, where rereading is not permitted, reading time for punchlines is usually longer than that for neutral endings (Coulson & Kutas, 1998; Mayerhofer & Schacht, 2015). However, in free reading, the reader might not need to examine the punchline multiple times, as long as they had reread previous texts. The difference in total looking time was only marginally significant in another eye-tracking study that used a free reading paradigm (Coulson et al., 2006).

Results from the fourth contrast (non-mind-wandering vs. mind-wandering across all sentence types) differ from those in Experiment 1. We did not observe any significant difference in eye movement measures between mind-wandering and non-mind-wandering, aggregating over jokes and controls. Therefore, sentence endings in general received about the same amount of visual attention during mind-wandering and non-mind-wandering. Despite these inconsistencies, we again observed reduced rereading and recall advantage for jokes during mind-wandering.

**Additional Analysis: Mind-Wandering and Lexical Processing**

Existing theories offer different accounts for why deficits at higher level linguistic processes occur during mind-wandering. The cascade model of inattention posits that deficits at higher level processes are rooted in deficits at lower level processes (Smallwood, 2011), whereas the levels of inattention hypothesis posits that higher level deficits can still occur even when lower level processes are intact (Schad et al., 2012). To adjudicate between the two accounts, we explored whether lexical processing at the punchline was also affected during mind-wandering. Specifically, we examined if the word frequency effect, as measured by the two early measures (gaze duration and skipping), was modulated by attention. If lexical processing at the ending was indeed impaired during mind-wandering, we should observe a smaller word frequency effect, compared to when participants were on-task. We combined data from Experiment 1 and the replication to improve statistical power. This analysis was not preregistered.

**Figure 3**

*Fixed Effects of Regression Analysis on the Interaction Between Attention and Word Frequency*

- **a. Log10 of Gaze Duration**
  - Freq: $-0.039^{***}$
  - Freq: Intentional mind-wandering: $0.015$
  - Freq: Unintentional mind-wandering: $0.000$
  - Intentional mind-wandering: $0.005$
  - Unintentional mind-wandering: $-0.008$

- **b. Skipping (0/1)**
  - Freq: $0.512^{***}$
  - Freq: Intentional mind-wandering: $-0.309^{**}$
  - Freq: Unintentional mind-wandering: $-0.097$
  - Intentional mind-wandering: $0.424^{***}$
  - Unintentional mind-wandering: $0.154$

*Note.* Attention (on-task, intentional mind-wandering, unintentional mind-wandering) was dummy-coded, with “on-task” as reference level. Freq = Log10 of word frequency. $^{*} p < .05$. $^{**} p < .01$. $^{***} p < .001$. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
The fixed effects of our analysis are shown in Figure 3. In general, the word frequency effect during mind-wandering did not significantly differ from that when participants were on-task, except for a smaller word frequency effect during intentional mind-wandering on word skipping. Thus, we did not find consistent evidence suggesting deficits at the lexical level during mind-wandering.

General Discussion

Garden-path jokes work by disrupting a narrative understanding built from the initial set-up. The higher level processes of resolving the semantic incongruity are cognitively demanding, and this makes such jokes a promising venue for studying how we manage our attention in the face of distractions. The two studies described in the current article suggest that the resolution of semantic incongruity depends on the reader’s moment-to-moment attentional state.

The Incongruity-Resolution Process

Our results obtained from the on-task condition support the incongruity-resolution theory of garden-path joke processing (Suls, 1972, 1983). In both studies, jokes read without mind-wandering elicited more rereading from the punchline than from the nonfunny controls, as if participants were reexamining previous parts of the text to find clues for an alternative explanation. Moreover, similar to Coulson et al. (2006), we did not observe any difference between joke and controls in the early measures of reading (i.e., gaze duration and skipping), but observed a significant difference in total looking time (only in the main study). These findings suggest that the processing cost was related to a higher level stage of language processing.

Additional rereading triggered by the punchline also fits with a recently updated computational model of eye movement control during reading (E-Z Reader 10; Reichle et al., 2009). In the E-Z reader model, the majority of regressions are due to difficulties in the postlexical processing stage. Specifically, regressive eye movements can be initiated when the reader detects a failure in the integration of the current word into the overall meaning of the sentence (i.e., rapid integration failure). On the other hand, these results do not seem to fit well with the saccade-generation with inhibition by foveal targets (SWIFT) model (Engbert et al., 2005). The SWIFT model assumes that the majority of regressions are due to unfinished lexical processing. Because garden-path jokes in theory do not entail additional processing at the lexical level, lexical difficulties do not seem to be the main reason that triggered rereading from punchlines. However, garden-path jokes can be a special case and our findings may have no bearing on the overall utility of the SWIFT model.

Joke Processing During Mind-Wandering

The current research contributes to a growing body of literature on how mind-wandering disrupts higher level cognitive processes of reading. While some previous studies have used self-paced reading to answer this question (Smallwood, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2008), we reasoned that the rereading pattern in a free reading setting can convey important information about the reader’s attentional state. Our two studies show that the additional rereading from the punchline observed in the on-task condition was generally reduced during mind-wandering. Mind-wandering also affected how well participants remembered the punchline during a subsequent cued-recall task. These results indicate that the incongruity-resolution process was impaired during mind-wandering, making the processing of a joke less distinguishable from the processing of a neutral sentence.

Mind-wandering during reading has been theorized as “attentional decoupling,” such that attention shifts away from the linguistic input to internal thoughts and exerts less control on eye movements. Previous studies have shown that attentional decoupling can be measured at the lexical level, using variables such as word frequency (Foulsham et al., 2013; Reichle et al., 2010). The current study shows that attentional decoupling can also be measured at an advanced level of text processing. Moreover, our preliminary analysis did not find consistent evidence of deficits at the lexical level during mind-wandering. Thus, deficits at the higher level stage during mind-wandering in our study cannot be solely attributed to deficits at the lexical level. This finding complicates assumptions that attentional decoupling during reading follows an “all-or-none” manner (Smallwood, 2011), but instead points to an alternative claim that attentional decoupling is graded in nature (Schad et al., 2012). Word recognition for skilled readers is largely automated, which may make it less susceptible to mind-wandering’s effects. However, higher level processes are usually more effortful and may go astray during even weak levels of inattention.

We used cued-recall performance as an offline measure of joke processing. The results in the on-task condition replicated the humor effect, such that people have better memory for information perceived as humorous (Schmidt, 1994, 2002). Importantly, our results suggest that one contributing factor is the elaborated visual processing triggered by semantic incongruity. However, this recall advantage disappeared during mind-wandering. While recall and comprehension are usually related, the current study did not directly measure whether the reader “got” the joke. Instead, we measured a cognitive process that is necessary but not sufficient for getting a joke (Dynel, 2009). In other words, the reader might not have understood the joke after extensive processing. If so, the reader might still be able to report the ending but not the intended meaning of the text. In this sense, not getting a joke does not always mean that the reader was mind-wandering.

A potential future research direction is to look at whether rereading patterns, at least in some situations, can help detect mind-wandering. Research on mind-wandering has relied critically on asking participants to diagnose their mental states. While self-categorized mind-wandering seems valid (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), the field is in need of more objective measurements to resolve important theoretical debates (Smallwood, 2013). Moreover, the ability to identify when people are mind-wandering without interrupting them would open the possibility of systems that could respond to wandering attention to promote better task performance. There has been important progress in this line of research (e.g., Bixler & D’Mello, 2016; Faber et al., 2018). However, the best performing models appear to favor global features (text-irrelevant features) over local features. We note that local features may boost prediction performance in a more clearly
defined setting, such as reading texts that contain occasional inconsistencies. When certain words trigger rereading, failing to do so can indicate a breakdown of attention.

We believe that mind-wandering research can benefit from connecting theories about attention to theories about language processing. To illustrate their interactions, eye-tracking will be an important methodology. We hope the current research will promote this integration, so that we can better understand how people manage their attention in different contexts with different distractions that surround them.

References

Author, A. A., Author, B. B., Author, C. C., Author, D. D., Author, E. E., manage their attention in different contexts with different distractions. When certain words trigger rereading, failing to do so can indicate a breakdown of attention.

We believe that mind-wandering research can benefit from connecting theories about attention to theories about language processing. To illustrate their interactions, eye-tracking will be an important methodology. We hope the current research will promote this integration, so that we can better understand how people manage their attention in different contexts with different distractions that surround them.

References


MISSING THE JOKE


Revision received June 6, 2019
Accepted June 6, 2019